Wednesday, June 11, 2008

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study

The Rand counterinsurgency study reports are making the round and they have released another report in the series.

The report by Seth Jones is Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study - vol 4. The direct link is but the page with information about it and links to the other vols and papers can be found at or see the list below.

A related report of interest is Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies

According to the summary for Vol 4 - "This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive."

RAND Counterinsurgency Study series:
Heads We Win -- The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN): RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Paper 1

Subversion and Insurgency: RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Paper 2

Understanding Proto-Insurgencies: RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Paper 3

Money in the Bank -- Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations: RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Paper 4

The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand -- Understanding the Conflict's Evolving Dynamic: RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Paper 5

Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence -- The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006: RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Paper 6

Byting Back -- Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents
RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Volume 1

Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006): RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Volume 2

Rethinking Counterinsurgency: RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Volume 5

War by Other Means -- Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency : RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Final Report

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